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Bilateral Cooperation 
and Bounded 
Sovereignty in 
Counter-Terrorism 
Efforts
The ‘Global War on Terror,’ led by the United States, emphasizes the role of international 
alliances in tackling terrorist threats. By their very nature, international counterterrorism 
efforts challenge state sovereignty by requiring changes to both foreign and domestic 
policies. This, in turn, creates complex sovereignty issues and raises some interesting 
questions for closer examination. How has cooperation in counterterrorism altered 
the perceptions and behavior of allies of the United States? Has the post-9/11 security 
environment constrained the sovereignty of other nations? This paper will analyze 
Canada’s cooperation with the US in order to explore these questions. The study argues 
that Canada’s sovereignty has been bounded, but not determined, by US demands. 
Examining the relationship between the US and Canada can help us understand both 
the limitations and the continuing relevance of the traditional concepts of power, 
sovereignty and interdependence in international relations. 
and international variables (Jones 
2006). Few studies have explored the 
implications of this for the theory and 
practice of international relations. This 
paper will show how both domestic 
and interstate factors came into play in 
counterterrorism cooperation between 
the US and Canada. 
The post-9/11 environment illustrates 
both US power and the limits upon it. 
On the one hand, the problems the 
US has faced in Iraq and Afghanistan 
have exposed the boundaries of 
its hegemony. On the other hand, 
although perceptions of threat and 
acceptable responses to them differ 
widely even among the closest of allies, 
we see a high degree of compliance with 
US demands on counterinsurgency 
and counterterrorism operations 
(Byman 2006a). The US and many 
INTRODUCTION
Given the transnational nature of 
many contemporary terrorist groups, it 
follows that the United States’ Global 
War on Terror (GWOT) emphasizes 
the role of international alliances in 
tackling terrorist threats (Sageman 2004; 
Asal et al. 2007; “National Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism” 2006). Building 
cooperative relations with other states 
in counterterrorism (CT) operations 
has been a challenging process. By 
their very nature, international CT 
operations confront state sovereignty by 
requiring changes in both foreign and 
domestic policies. In many cases, such 
operations necessitate coordination of 
overarching federal security issues with 
local functions such as law enforcement 
(Byman 2006b). This, in turn, creates 
complex sovereignty issues, involving 
a dynamic relation between domestic 
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of its NATO allies have had differing, 
even conflicting, positions on domestic 
surveillance, interrogation and policies 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nonetheless, 
US ability to harness the cooperation, 
whether voluntary or through the threat 
of military or economic retaliation, 
of numerous countries in its so-called 
war on terror illustrates the presence 
of a distinct authority structure in the 
international system (Donnelly 2006).  
This raises some interesting issues for 
closer examination. Has the post-9/11 
security environment constrained the 
sovereignty of other nations? How has 
CT cooperation altered the perceptions 
and behavior of allies of the United 
States? This paper will explore Canada’s 
cooperation with the US on post-9/11 
security measures to understand the 
extent to which Canadian sovereignty 
has been limited or altered as a result. 
Through a realist lens, it could be argued 
that, because of the density of reciprocal 
ties, US-Canada relations do not form a 
typical case from which generalizations 
can be made. The relations between the 
two countries illuminate little about 
the international system or interstate 
relations in general (Keohane and Nye 
2001). This paper contends that, for 
precisely these reasons, the interactions 
between the two neighbors deserve 
closer examination. Understanding US-
Canada relations can help illuminate the 
ramifications of dense and asymmetrical 
interdependence. Some authors have 
argued that the security community 
formed by the US and Canada is 
based on so many shared interests and 
values that reciprocity defines their 
relationship. Others are more skeptical, 
arguing that the interdependence 
between the two countries is so 
asymmetrical that Canadian autonomy 
has been severely impacted by American 
dominance (Massie 2007). The findings 
of this paper are that the reality lies 
between these two extremes. Canadian 
policy is bounded, but not determined, 
by US hegemony. The asymmetrical 
interdependence between the two 
countries limits, but does not negate, 
Canadian autonomy. Examining the 
relationship between the US and 
Canada, particularly in the context of 
the highly-securitized environment of 
the post-9/11 world, can help us probe 
both the limitations and the continuing 
relevance of traditional concepts of 
power, sovereignty, autonomy and 
interdependence. 
COOPeRATION, 
INTeRDePeNDeNCe 
AND SOveReIgNTy IN 
INTeRNATIONAl RelATIONS
Many studies recognize the presence 
of cooperative relations between states 
(Axelrod 1984; Keohane and Nye 1977; 
Wendt 1999; Hoffman 2006). However, 
cooperation in counterterrorism (CT) 
operations challenges state sovereignty 
in particularly strong ways. CT 
operations blur the lines between 
domestic and international policy. 
Highly sensitive issues, such as domestic 
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surveillance, intelligence gathering and 
sharing, coordination of immigration 
and assimilation policies, military 
cooperation and border security, are 
involved.  
Interdependence, particularly 
asymmetrical interdependence, can 
alter the ways in which nations exercise 
their sovereignty. While “sovereignty” 
is a much-contested concept, a widely 
cited author argues that it is has four 
principal components. When a state 
enjoys international legal sovereignty, 
it is recognized by other states as a 
legal equal. Westphalian sovereignty 
establishes a state’s territorial 
boundaries and asserts that the state has 
sole control over legitimate behavior 
within this territory. Interdependent 
sovereignty means that the state has the 
ability to control movements across its 
borders. Finally, domestic sovereignty 
or autonomy asserts that the state and 
its rulers have the capacity to make 
policy and control developments within 
their jurisdictional territory (Krasner 
1999). Complete sovereignty implies 
that the state is free from any form of 
external control and can autonomously 
make policy free from the interference 
of other governments. In short, 
sovereignty refers to the idea that states 
are autonomous and independent from 
each other. While some might view 
that sovereignty implies a grant of 
unconstrained will and power to the 
state, sovereignty has, in fact, always 
been limited by international norms, 
laws and the actions of other states. The 
degree to which a state’s sovereignty is 
constrained is relative to its military, 
economic and ideational power. For 
example, the US has, for much of its 
existence, enjoyed a considerable degree 
of autonomy and control; however, 
less powerful states have not (Krasner 
2001c, 2001b). 
Globalization and growing 
interdependence have altered the 
degree to which states are, in fact, 
autonomous. While smaller states are 
most often constrained in their exercise 
of sovereignty, even larger countries 
such as the US may find their autonomy 
limited by external forces, such as 
trade agreements or the demands of 
other governments. A state can limit 
another’s ability to formulate policy 
and control its borders in a variety of 
different ways. The more complex and 
dense the ties between two countries, 
the more influence they may have 
on each other. If one state has greater 
military or economic power, it can 
exercise a greater degree of influence 
over weaker countries. On the other 
hand, the concept of ‘defense against 
help’ illustrates how less powerful states, 
such as Canada, use a mix of unilateral 
and cooperative defense measurements 
to protect themselves while also 
working with the dominant state, 
such as the US (Barry and Brat 2008).1 
As will be demonstrated in this paper, 
interdependence, and asymmetrical 
interdependence in particular, can 
1 Barry and Brat (2008) 
provide a valuable, his-
torical perspective of how 
Canada has worked with 
the US but has also taken 
unilateral steps to protect 
its own interests.  This 
article extends the discus-
sion of small state-large 
state security relations by 
discussing the concept of 
bounded sovereignty and 
providing a closer exami-
nation of the developments 
since 2001. 
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exercise an important constraining 
influence on sovereignty. While this is 
the case in many areas of cooperation, 
such as climate governance and trade, 
balancing security, interdependence and 
sovereignty is particularly challenging. 
This is because security-related issues, 
such as countering terrorism and 
enhancing border security, are seen 
as particularly germane to a nation’s 
immediate interests. 
COOPeRATION BeTweeN 
The US AND CANADA IN 
COUNTeRTeRRORISm
The relationship between the US and 
Canada involves a very high degree 
of trust. Canada has been a steadfast 
political, military and economic ally 
of the US for several decades. The 
two countries have a relationship 
of close, albeit highly asymmetric, 
interdependence. Canada’s economic 
well-being is dependent on its trade with 
the US, while the reverse does not hold 
to the same degree. Almost $1.2 billion 
in trade crosses the US-Canada border 
every day. While about 25 percent of 
US trade goes to Canada, 87 percent of 
Canada’s trade is US-bound. 40 percent 
of Canada’s GDP is tied to exports to the 
US, while only 2.5 percent of US GDP is 
tied to exports to Canada. At the same 
time, while the US economy is more 
diversified, Canada remains a crucial 
partner for American business (Byman 
2006b). Canada is the leading energy 
supplier to the US, making it a very 
valuable ally. In sum, the two countries 
are highly interdependent; however, 
the power differential between them 
illustrates a classic case of asymmetric 
interdependence, with Canada as the 
junior partner. 
The US and Canada are closely 
tied through collective security 
arrangements. Conflicts between the 
two countries are, and are expected to 
be, resolved peacefully. War is not even 
considered a remote possibility (Adler 
and Barnett 1998; Donnelly 2006; 
Jackson 2007). One example of the trust-
based relationship between the two 
countries is the shared border which, 
historically, has had few compliance or 
monitoring mechanisms in place. This 
is not to say that border relations have 
been completely devoid of conflict; 
however, in large part, they have been 
harmonious and cooperative.
The events of 9/11 altered this 
dynamic. In the immediate aftermath 
of the attack, the border was virtually 
sealed, adversely affecting the 
substantial volume of trade between 
the two countries. Subsequently, several 
prominent American lawmakers, 
including Senator Hillary Clinton, 
alleged that some of the 9/11 hijackers 
entered the US across the Canadian 
border. While the allegation proved to 
be untrue, overall concerns about the 
‘porous border’ remained. The Report 
of the 9/11 Commission highlighted 
concerns about border security. 
It pointed out that the American 
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government had failed to consider 
the potentially dangerous impact of 
Canada’s immigration and refugee 
policies. It also noted existent terrorist 
group activity in Canada. Other 
prominent studies have discussed the 
activities of the Sri Lankan group, the 
Liberation of Tamil Tigers Eelam (LTTE), 
and the Canada-based Sikh militants 
who masterminded the bombing of an 
Air India flight in 1985 (Rae 2005; Lake 
2007; Becker 2006). The 9/11 report 
faulted the American government for 
not having added resources on the 
border even after a potential terrorist 
had entered the US through Canada 
in 1999.2 It called for the tightening 
of border controls through measures 
such as the introduction of biometric 
passports and visas. The proposal on 
biometrics was subsequently passed 
into law through the Enhanced Border 
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 
2002 (“The 9/11 Commission Report” 
2004; Rudolph 2006).3 
In June 2006, Canadian authorities 
arrested a group of suspected terrorists 
in Toronto, who were accused of 
planning attacks within Canada. 
This exacerbated US (and Canadian) 
anxiety. Some Congresspersons were 
critical of the allegedly lax attitude of 
the Canadian Prime Minister towards 
the possibility of Islamist terrorists 
being present in his country (“The 
Need to Implement WHTI to Protect US 
Homeland Security” 2006). Although 
the initial fear of the unprotected border 
has decreased, and hard evidence 
about alleged terrorists “infiltrating” 
the US through Canada is noticeably 
absent, the American government has 
continued to implement a number 
of measures that restrict free passage 
across the US-Canada border.
A SeCURITy 
PReDICAmeNT BeTweeN 
FRIeNDS
For most of the period since the 
American Civil War, the open border 
between the two countries has not 
only facilitated trade and relatively 
open movement of people, but also 
symbolized a strong, trust-based 
relationship. The apprehension of 
Ahmed Ressam in December 1999 
raised some, albeit limited, concerns 
about the shared border. Ressam, an 
Algerian national who had been living 
in Canada for five years, was arrested 
after attempting to enter Washington 
State on a ferry from Victoria, BC, 
with a trunk full of explosive material. 
This incident prompted the first set of 
concerns within the US Congress about 
the Canadian border (Andreas 2005); 
however, it did not have a lasting 
impact on border security policies. 
9/11 securitized the relationship 
between the neighbors to an 
unprecedented degree. Although no 
one from or in Canada played any 
role in the attacks, the border created 
a deep sense of derived or perceptual 
insecurity for the US. The situation 
2 This was a reference 
to Ahmed Ressam, the 
so-called “millennium 
bomber,” who was appre-
hended while attempting 
to enter the US through 
Washington state in De-
cember 2009. 
3 The full Report of the 
9/11 Commission can be 
found at
http://www.gpoaccess.
gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf.
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can be seen as analogous to a security 
dilemma. A security dilemma occurs 
because attempts made by one state to 
increase its own security may decrease 
the perceived security of another state. 
Given the anarchic structure of the 
international system, constant mistrust 
and uncertainty about the motivations 
of others perpetuates insecurity among 
states (Jervis 1978). 
The concept of the security dilemma is 
usually employed to explain adversarial 
relations between states such as India 
and Pakistan, or the US and USSR. Yet, it 
can also explain why, after 9/11, the US 
viewed Canada, one of its most reliable 
allies, with such intense suspicion. 
While this is a departure from the 
traditional application of the concept, 
it helps us understand the perceptual 
mistrust that entered the relationship 
in response to exogenous events.4 This 
development is particularly noteworthy 
because of the close cooperation 
between the two countries across 
a number of issues. At issue were 
Canada’s domestic policies, namely 
what the US believed to be Canada’s 
excessively liberal immigration laws. 
In the heightened crisis environment, 
Americans perceived these policies as 
threatening to their security interests. 
They feared that the open border 
between the two countries would be 
exploited by potential terrorists seeking 
to enter the US through Canada. In other 
words, although the Canadian state 
continued to be seen as a trustworthy 
ally, its internal policies became a 
cause of US insecurity. This insecurity 
was predicated on the American 
perception that Canada was unwilling 
and unable to control its borders and 
limit the activities of potential terrorists 
operating within Canadian territory. 
The security predicament discussed 
here is certainly distinct from the 
traditional notion of a dilemma, 
in that the latter refers to a spiral 
of aggressive actions as a result of 
perceived threats. In this case, we 
did not see a breakdown in relations 
or cooperation, nor an escalation in 
aggressive posturing. What did occur 
was a negative US reaction to Canadian 
domestic politics and border policing. 
Canadian policies on immigration and 
border controls were seen to threaten 
US interests. Like traditional security 
dilemmas, however, this one was based 
on perception, rather than an objective 
understanding of Canadian policies or 
their possible impact. Nonstate actors, 
rather than the Canadian state itself, 
are seen as the threat. Such an approach 
marks an interesting shift away from a 
militarized perception of security and 
borders (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006; 
Andreas 2003), revealing the complex 
intersection between domestic and 
foreign policy. 
4 Note that the 9/11 
attackers had no links 
whatsoever to Canada.   
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COOPeRATION AFTeR 
9/11: CANADIAN 
DeFeReNCe TO US 
hegemONy
When states are uncertain about 
the motivations of other states, 
they demand signals of reassurance 
(Kydd 2001). After 9/11, the US faced 
uncertainty about the implications of 
Canada’s domestic policies. Canada 
is widely seen by the international 
community as having one of the 
world’s most generous immigration 
and asylum-granting policies. Any 
person who arrives in Canada can apply 
for refugee status and move around 
the country freely while awaiting a 
determination. Those who are denied 
refugee protection are not aggressively 
pursued for deportation. From the 
perspective of American lawmakers, 
such policies could allow potential 
security threats to go unnoticed (Smick 
2006). The US solution to this was fairly 
simple: Canada should reassure the US 
by modifying its domestic laws in line 
with American interests or face a more 
restrictive border (de Nevers 2007). In 
effect, this meant that the US sought 
to limit Canadian autonomy in the 
formulation of domestic policy and the 
regulation of its border. 
In response, the Canadian government 
took a series of steps to mitigate US 
concerns and assure the Americans 
that bilateral cooperation would not 
endanger national security. Because 
the US was not directly threatened 
by Canadian actions, Canada’s 
reassurances contained no promises of 
self-restraint. Rather, Canada promised 
that it would cooperate on border 
security and restrain those citizens, 
residents or visitors who might aim 
to harm the US. Such reassurances, by 
their very nature, require changes in 
domestic policy and therefore constrain 
the exercise of national sovereignty. 
Although Canadian officials often 
seek to give the impression to their 
public that they are resisting pressure 
from Washington and making decisions 
independent of US concerns, it is clear 
that several changes have been made 
to avoid punitive action by the US 
(Andreas, 2003).5 Steps taken to address 
US concerns included the Canada-US 
Smart Border Declaration and Action 
Plan and Free and Secure Trade (FAST), 
which facilitates the cross-border flow of 
regular commercial traffic (Wasem et al. 
2006). The declaration does not include 
any enforcement mechanisms. No 
sanctions or other punishments were 
stipulated in the accord; nonetheless, 
compliance with its provisions has been 
high. This is a significant display of the 
shared norms, as well as continuing 
trust-based interactions that are 
common between the two countries.
Domestic policies in Canada were also 
modified to a significant degree. For 
example, in December 2001, Canada 
passed the Anti-Terror Act. Among 
other measures, this Act provides for a 
5 The extent to which 
public comments about 
‘autonomy’ have been 
made has differed between 
the Liberal government of 
former Prime Minister Jean 
Chrétien and the current  
Conservative government 
led by Stephen Harper. 
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list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 
very similar to that identified by the 
US Department of State.6 In June 2002, 
Canada introduced an Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) which 
provided for the expedited removal 
of persons who pose security threats, 
additional screening for asylum seekers 
and new penalties on those providing 
false evidence to enter or remain in 
Canada (Harvey 2005). In 2003, Canada 
created Public Safety Canada, which was 
its corollary to the US Department of 
Homeland security, giving a centralized 
umbrella to departments and agencies 
responsible for national security. These 
steps were supposedly taken to protect 
national security; but, notwithstanding 
a few exceptions, there is little evidence 
that Canada’s physical security was 
under direct and immediate threat. A 
more likely explanation is that the US’s 
security predicament was threatening 
Canada’s economic interests (Lennox 
2007).
As mentioned earlier, insecurity is an 
inherently perceptual phenomenon. 
As a result, Canada launched a spirited 
public relations campaign to dispel the 
damaging perception that its domestic 
policies and the open border were 
damaging American security interests. 
A prominent section of the website of 
the Canadian Embassy in Washington, 
D.C., is devoted to assuaging US anxiety, 
reiterating that Canadian immigration 
laws are designed to screen out those 
who are a threat to national security.7 
“CanadaAlly,” another government-
sponsored website, emphasizes 
Canada’s steadfast support of the US. 
Reassuring American audiences that 
enhancing border security is a priority 
for Canada, it promises to streamline 
and tighten immigration policies and 
screen for potential entrants into the 
country.8 Interestingly, the website also 
vigorously objects to the argument 
that similar methods of security and 
screening be applied to the northern 
and southern borders of the US.9 
This highlights Canada’s interest in 
maintaining a “special relationship” 
with its neighbor, based on a mutuality 
of interests and identities. Because 
immigration policies are considered 
a sovereign issue, it is an unusual step 
in international relations for a country 
to assuage the security concerns of its 
neighbor by changing its policies. 
CONSTRAINeD 
SOveReIgNTy OR 
CAlCUlATeD SelF-
INTeReST?
Does this mean that Canadian 
sovereignty is subordinate to US 
demands? In fact, a closer examination 
shows us that Canada’s actions and 
policies are not entirely a function of 
US hegemonic control. Historically, 
Canada has been able to obtain 
valuable concessions from the US that 
have resulted in economic benefits for 
Canada. In a study of interstate disputes 
between 1950 and 1969, Keohane and 
Nye (2001) find that, in at least half of 
6 For example, the US lists 
the Shining Path of Peru 
as a FTO while Canada 
does not. Identification of 
Islamist terrorist groups, 
particularly in the Middle 
East, is virtually identical.
7 http://geo.international.
gc.ca/can-am/washington/
defence/cirpaposition-en.
asp. 
8 http://www.canadianally.
com/ca/pdf/natsecurnat_e.
pdf.
9 See http://geo.inter-
national.gc.ca/can-am/
washington/defence/
misperceptions-en.asp for 
more information.
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the cases, the outcomes were closer to 
the interests of Canada than the US. 
This was achieved partly through skillful 
bargaining, which can compensate 
for an unfavorable asymmetry in 
power structure. In addition, Canada 
is an important enough trade partner, 
both in volume of American exports 
and US reliance on Canada’s energy 
imports, that the US cannot assert an 
entirely unilateral approach towards its 
northern neighbor. 
 Changes to Canada’s immigration 
and refugee policies have been under 
active consideration by the Canadian 
government since at least 1997. 
Elements of the Anti-Terrorist Act of 
December 2001 and the Public Safety 
Act 2001 were first considered in 
1998. Since 1984, Canada has been 
deeply concerned about the activities 
of terrorist groups within its territory 
(Massie 2007). 9/11 provided an 
opportunity to institutionalize some 
long-considered policy modifications. 
In sum, although deference to US 
demands was a major trigger for the 
changes to domestic policy, it was 
by no means the only motivating 
factor. Nonetheless, Canada’s efforts to 
publicize new policies to a US audience 
illustrate the fact that reassuring 
Americans is considered pivotal to 
Canadian interests. 
 Reciprocal, rather than unilateral, 
trust-based interactions have long 
been the defining feature in bilateral 
relations. Information sharing, within 
the bounds of national sovereignty, has 
underlined several cases of successful 
law enforcement both before and 
after 9/11. Joint investigation and 
real-time information sharing have 
led to successful operations against 
illegal immigration in both countries. 
Another area in which formal and 
informal contacts between officials 
have been useful to the interest of both 
countries is in the effort to combat drug 
trafficking.10 Shared surveillance and 
tracking techniques have been used 
extensively in anti-narcotics operation 
throughout both countries. Attempts 
have been made to synchronize and 
harmonize drug importation policies 
and criminal justice, reflecting 
a reciprocity-based approach to 
cooperation (Andreas and Nadelmann 
2006). Canadian authorities are often 
interested in having cross-border drug-
related offences tried in the US because 
of more stringent incarceration laws. In 
addition, entities such as the Integrated 
Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) and 
the Integrated Border Intelligence Team 
show examples of policy coordination 
based on reciprocity rather than 
hegemonic domination.11 
ReSISTANCe TO US 
hegemONy: IRAq AND 
The ARAR CASe
Even in matters of security, while 
adopting a generally deferential 
policy towards its neighbor, Canada 
has resisted US hegemony in a few 
10 Interview with Ca-
nadian  and American 
officials, 2007 
11 Interview with Canadi-
an and American officials, 
2007
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areas. Canada’s refusal to support the 
war in Iraq was an unusual, thought 
not unprecedented, case in which 
Canada turned down its closest allies, 
the UK and the US. Canadian public 
opinion ran strongly against the war, in 
particular because it was not supported 
by the United Nations (Vucetic 2006). 
While Canada is constrained in bilateral 
security relations, it has more flexibility 
in responding to international 
situations. Multilateral institutions such 
as the United Nations are a mechanism 
for it to try to constrain the behavior 
of large powers (Barry and Brat 2008). 
The case of Maher Arar highlighted the 
conflicts that can arise when interstate 
cooperation interferes with domestic 
interests. As a result of the controversy, 
Canadian guidelines on information-
sharing for Canadian officials have 
changed. For example, cases involving 
national security concerns must now 
be routed through Ottawa rather 
than being handled at the local or 
provincial level.12 Such centralization 
is an unusual development in the 
trust-based relations between the 
two countries. Such constraints may 
also adversely impact the US-driven 
interest in speedy and agile information 
sharing in counterterrorism operations. 
Interestingly, the extent to which 
rendition and other counterterrorism 
practices have been questioned by 
the American public and Congress 
highlights a significant amount of doubt 
within the US about the acceptability, 
validity and desirability of such actions. 
This illustrates a common normative 
perspective between the two countries.13
ASymmeTRICAl 
INTeRDePeNDeNCe AND 
BOUNDeD SOveReIgNTy
The US and Canada can be categorized 
as unprovokable allies, who enjoy 
cooperation predicated on trust. Such 
allies have a high density of ties and 
require few compliance mechanisms. At 
the same time, trust and suspicion are 
not dichotomous variables; rather, they 
co-exist on a continuum. Levels of trust 
may change with reference to specific 
issues among allies, as they have with 
regard to Canada and border security.
9/11 did not alter the fundamental 
nature and structure of US-Canadian 
relations, which is marked both by a 
history of reciprocal relations and clear 
American dominance. Nonetheless, the 
level of trust between the two countries 
did erode to some extent. This was 
particularly the case from the point of 
view of the US government. Prior to 
2001, the open border between the two 
countries symbolized a relationship of 
mutual trust, requiring little enforcement 
and relying on localized interactions. 
After 9/11, many Americans viewed 
the border as something that could 
be exploited by potential terrorists. 
This led the US government to pursue 
an unprecedented level of border 
security and to demand changes to 
Canadian domestic policies. Dense 
ties continued, but the relationship 
12 Personal interview with 
Canadian officials, 2007.
13 See for example, Garcia, 
Michael John. 2007. “Ren-
ditions: Constraints Im-
posed by Laws on Torture.” 
Washington, DC: Congres-
sional Research Services 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
natsec/RL32890.pdf (June 
5, 2008). 
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was marked by increasing American 
assertion. Concerned about national 
economic interests, the Canadian 
government acceded to many American 
requests. This shows that, given a 
relationship marked by asymmetrical 
interdependence, Canadian policy 
autonomy was constrained by US 
demands. 
At the same time, American CT 
operations affected Canada’s trust in 
the US, particularly after Mr. Arar’s 
rendition. This case directly led 
Canada to solidify its own monitoring 
mechanisms, designed to centralize, 
supervise and limit information-
sharing between the two countries. 
While Canada has complied with many 
US demands, it still exercises strong 
national sovereignty, as demonstrated 
by its refusal to participate in the Iraq 
war and its responses to Mr. Arar’s 
rendition (Hillmer 2003; Cooper 2005; 
Sands 2006). 
Figure 1 illustrates some of the 
changes in relations between the two 
countries since 2001. Prior to the 9/11 
attacks, close ties and high trust levels 
underlined US-Canada exchanges. 
After 9/11, a security predicament 
arose among American audiences as 
a result of heightened anxiety about 
Canadian policies towards immigrants. 
In response, Canada offered several acts 
of reassurance which constrained its 
sovereignty but protected its economic 
interests. Close, reciprocal ties have 
continued, but within an altered 
dynamic. 
The relationship between the US and 
Canada illustrates the contradictory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-9/11 9/11 Post-9/11
USA
USA
Increasing anxiety
Unilateral demandsSecurity 
predicament
CANADA CANADA
Acts of reassurance
Bounded sovereignty
Dense ties
High trust levels
Asymmetric interdependence
Figure 1: Impact of 9/11 on Bilateral Relations
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pulls of sovereignty and asymmetrical 
interdependence. The US extends 
its hegemony over both interstate 
interactions and Canadian domestic 
policy. Canada, while relinquishing 
significant amounts of its sovereignty, 
gains from the benefits of the political 
and economic order provided by the 
dominant state. The legitimacy of the 
hierarchical relationship rests on the 
ability of the US to provide a stable 
economic and political order which 
helps maintain Canada’s prosperity and 
security (Lake 2007). 
This does not, however, mean that 
Canada’s sovereignty is lost; rather, it is 
bounded by the US-led hierarchy. If we 
view sovereignty as territorial integrity 
and political independence (Sinclair 
and Byers 2007), we can conclude that 
Canada does enjoy both.14 However; 
its political independence is bounded 
by its interdependent relation with 
the US. For Canada, both its military 
and economic security are closely, 
even inextricably, linked to the US. 
From this perspective, deference to the 
demands of the US is not so much an 
outcome of limited sovereignty, as it is 
a conscious choice. The choice is based 
both on rational self-interest (protect 
Canada’s trade and military alliance 
with the US) as well as ideational factors 
(shared norms under the collective 
security arrangement with the US). 
Interests and identities are not static 
concepts; rather actors acquire them 
by participating in collective actions 
and meanings (Wendt, 1999). Canada 
has relinquished some of its autonomy 
to its collective arrangements with 
the US, but it has done so in order to 
protect its own interests. A parallel can 
be found in the European Union, where 
members make voluntary arrangements 
which restrict policy autonomy but 
optimize outcomes in other issue areas, 
such as trade or collective security 
(Krasner 2001a). Such a development 
highlights a fascinating phenomenon; 
that of states choosing to constrain 
their autonomy in highly sensitive 
issues (such as immigration) in order 
to strengthen bilateral (or multilateral) 
interdependence. 
Despite its hierarchical nature, the 
relationship between the two countries 
is one of interdependence. It is not 
entirely defined by American demands 
and Canadian compliance. The large 
shared border between the two countries 
makes Canada perennially significant 
for American security, both from an 
economic and a military point of view. 
A cooperative, rather than recalcitrant, 
Canada is certainly more beneficial for 
the US. The controversy surrounding 
the Arar case shows the pitfalls of 
excessive unilateral action. In addition, 
Canada’s considerable economic clout 
and its international ‘peacekeeper’ 
image can make it a valuable partner 
in influencing state sponsors of 
terrorism (Byman 2006b; Ignatieff 
2003). An understanding of the layers 
of complexity in relations of bilateral 
14 More nuanced concep-
tions of sovereignty also 
exist, such as discussions 
about ‘peoples’ sovereignty’ 
or the right of citizens to 
be protected from human 
rights abuses committed by 
their government. 
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and multilateral interdependence 
constitutes a valuable contribution to 
the study and practice of international 
relations. 
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